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Killing a second bird with one stone?
Promoting firm capital growth and exports through tax policy∗
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Abstract
Does a lower tax rate on profits promote the international activity of small and medium
enterprises? This paper addresses this question by exploiting a policy experiment in France.
A reduction in corporate taxation is found to boost small and medium enterprises’ capital
growth and export participation. We estimate that a 50% reduction in the statutory tax
rate induces, on average, a 29% increase in capital and a 6% increase in individual firms’
probability of exporting. However, the estimated average treatment effect on the treated
conceals substantial heterogeneity across firms with different initial productivity and size.
JEL classification: C21, C26, F14, H25, D24
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1 Introduction
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) tend to be under-represented in international trade,
despite their important contribution to countries’ aggregate output and employment. It follows
that their internationalization constitutes an important component of strategies to support
growth in sluggish economies. However, consensus has yet to emerge regarding the effectiveness
of different policies in achieving this objective, primarily due to the lack of empirical evidence
that would permit robust causal inference. Drawing from a large-scale survey of European
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companies, the EFIGE report recommends the removal of the institutional and fiscal barriers
to firm growth as the most effective means of fostering SMEs’ participation in foreign markets
(Altomonte et al., 2012). Although this claim is motivated by the well-documented stylized fact
that larger and more productive firms self-select into exporting (e.g, Bernard and Jensen, 1999),
there is still a lack of micro-level empirical evidence on the impact of fiscal policy on SMEs’
investment and export status.
The aim of this study is to fill this gap by exploiting the empirical setting offered by the 2001
French fiscal reform. It allows us to identify the impact of a reduction in corporate taxation (CT)
on SMEs’ growth and export participation. Over the period 2001-2003, the French government
reduced the corporate tax rate from 33.33% to 15% for SMEs’ profits up to e38,120. The stated
objective of this policy was to promote the growth of these companies and to remove their
incentive to shield profits from taxation by using debt financing (Raspiller, 2007). Eligibility
for the reduced tax rate depends on firm size, ownership and legal status, and it reflects the
government’s objective of targeting smaller and independent companies for this reduction. As a
result, not all companies are affected by this policy, and it is possible to identify the ‘treatment
effect’ of CT reduction by comparing treated and untreated companies.
We conduct our analysis on a dataset covering the population of French manufacturing firms
over the period 1997-2007. We first assign the firms in our dataset to the treatment group
and to various control groups. We then estimate a first Difference-in-Differences (DiD) model
to identify the impact of CT reduction on total assets, capital and employment. This model
compares the evolution of the outcome variables across different groups of firms before and after
the reform. We check for the presence of confounding factors by estimating a second DiD model
on the sample of treated firms. This second model identifies the treatment effect of the reform
by exploiting the different extent to which the same reduction of the statutory CT rate entails
different reductions of firm-specific effective tax rates (Egger et al., 2009). Having determined
that the reform has had a positive impact on firms’ capital growth, we exploit this policy shock
as a quasi-experiment to identify the causal effect of capital growth on firms’ export status by
using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) models. Specifically, a firm’s eligibility for CT reduction
is introduced as an instrument for capital growth in regressions on export status.
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The first contribution of the paper pertains to the vast literature on firm selection into
exporting. Abundant empirical evidence has established that exporters are larger and more
productive than non-exporters (e.g., Bernard et al., 1995; ISGEP, 2008) and that much of
this difference can be attributed to self-selection of the best performers into foreign markets.
Many studies from this literature attempt to establish causality between firm size and export
status by exploiting the sequencing of firm investment to perform a Granger test of causality
using longitudinal datasets.1 Because firms’ strategies are inter-temporal and unobserved by
researchers, this empirical approach does not convincingly address reverse causation between
investment and export participation, and it does not identify the causal relationship between
these two aspects of firm behaviour (Costantini and Melitz, 2008; Fabling and Sanderson, 2013).
In other words, observing that larger and more capital-intensive firms tend to self-select into
exporting or that investment in capital assets precedes export entry is not sufficient to establish
that a policy promoting capital investment would be effective in fostering export participation.
However, in our study, a consistent estimate of the causal relationship between firm capital and
export status is obtained by exploiting the exogeneity of the fiscal shock caused by the reform
with respect to firms’ unobserved policies.
In addition, our work contributes to the fiscal literature on the impact of CT on investment.
From a theoretical perspective, this literature predicts that, in the presence of decreasing returns
to capital, CT exerts a negative effect on firms’ investment (King and Fullerton, 1984; Devereux
and Griffith, 1999, 2003). Empirical contributions have primarily tested this prediction at the
macroeconomic level by exploiting cross-country differences in the effective average or marginal
rates of taxation, defined as the difference between the return on capital in the presence and in the
absence of taxation (e.g., Vartia, 2008; Bond and Xing, 2010).2 More recently, micro data have
been used to compute firm-specific effective rates of taxation to investigate the heterogeneous
impact of taxation on firms with different capital structures and asset compositions (Egger et al.,
2009; Arnold et al., 2011; Fabling et al., 2013). Because our empirical setting is based on a policy
1See Wagner (2007) for a review of the studies adopting this methodology.
2Specifically, Bond and Xing (2010) exploit the cross-country variations in the statutory tax rates and the
cross-industry variations in asset structures to model heterogeneous marginal costs of investment, while Vartia
(2008) interacts statutory tax rates with industry-specific variables and is interested in changes in the average
cost of investment.
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experiment, which allows us to control for both country- and firm-level confounding factors, we
contribute to this literature by providing more solid evidence of a negative relationship between
CT and investment in capital assets.
Our results suggest that lower corporate taxation promotes SMEs’ capital accumulation and,
through this channel, export participation. When comparing treated and untreated companies,
we find that, on average, the reform caused a 6% increase in capital assets and, through this
channel, a 1.4% increase in a firm’s probability of exporting. This modest effect conceals an
heterogeneous impact across treated firms. Indeed, when the analysis is restricted to small,
treated firms, the average treatment effect rises to a 29% increase in capital assets and a 6%
increase in export participation. Finally, we show that only the more productive firms within
each industry, especially the smaller ones, benefit from CT reduction in the form of growth and
export participation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical setting
offered by the French fiscal reform and the identification of treated and untreated firms in the
dataset. Section 3 illustrates the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results, and section
5 concludes.
2 Empirical Setting and Data
The introduction of a lower CT rate for French SMEs followed a general trend of tax reforms
in industrialized countries initiated in the 1970s. These reforms were generally characterized
by cuts in the statutory rates that were balanced by broadening the tax base. This made it
possible to reduce the fiscal pressure on individual companies while allowing for stable levels
of tax revenue (Devereux et al., 2002). In some instances, such as the UK and Canada, these
reforms also introduced a more favorable tax regime for small companies, motivated by difficulty
SMEs experience in accessing external finance and by their higher tax compliance costs (OECD,
1994). In the French case, the aim of the policymakers was to support investment, economic
growth and job creation, as explained by the then Minister of the Economy Laurent Fabius in
4
an article published by Le Monde.3
The 2001 fiscal reform was implemented in two steps. For eligible companies, the CT rate
declined from 33.3 to 25% in 2001, and it was further reduced to 15% in 2002. This reform
was part of a long-term tax-reduction plan initiated by a reform in 1997 that first introduced
lower profit taxation for SMEs. The 1997 and the 2001 fiscal reforms were promoted under both
right- and left-wing governments, and their implementation appears to be disconnected from
the political cycle.
For those companies that were already benefiting from the 1997 provision, the 2001 reform
represented a less radical change in taxation. If they had already responded to the 1997 tax
change with greater investment, the study of the 2001 reform in isolation may lead to an under-
estimation of the impact of CT reduction on investment. Nevertheless, we argue that this bias
is likely small because the scope of the 1997 reduction is much narrower than that introduced
in 2001. First, the eligibility conditions established in 1997 were more restrictive, causing the
policy to affect a smaller proportion of firms. The 1997 reform restricted the pool of beneficiaries
to firms with positive profits in the previous three consecutive fiscal years and required them
to reinvest the full amount of money saved through lower taxation. Second, the 2001 reform
generates greater tax gains for eligible firms, as it includes a lower tax rate compared to the
previous reform (i.e., 15% versus 19%) that applies to all profits below e38,120, while the 1997
reduction in the tax rate applied only to 25% of firms’ profits up to a maximum of 200,000F
(i.e., e30,500 c.a.). The difference in depth and scope between the two reforms is confirmed by
the fact that the average ratio of tax payments over profits plotted in figure 1 does not register
the 1997 reduction, whereas it very clearly reflects the impact of the 2001 reform.
A different concern arises because other measures (i.e., cuts in employers’ social contribu-
tions) had a timing similar to the policy of interest. Because these policies were not restricted to
the group of firms treated by the 2001 CT reduction, a DiD approach is sufficient to disentangle
the impact of lower profit taxation from confounding policies.
3Laurent Fabius, “Baisser les impôts pour préparer l’avenir” (Reduce taxes to prepare for the future), Le
Monde, August 28, 2001.
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2.1 The FICUS dataset
The Fichier complet unifié de Suse (FICUS) is a panel database assembled by the French Na-
tional Statistical Office (INSEE), and the coverage of the database approximates the universe of
French firms for the period 1997-2007. FICUS integrates data on balance sheet items collected
for fiscal purposes with survey data and provides information on over 4 million enterprises in
manufacturing and services.4 The analysis is restricted to the manufacturing sector because this
focus more closely conforms to the theoretical underpinnings of the hypothesis regarding the
impact of CT reduction on firm growth and export status.
The time periods 1997-2000 and 2003-2007 are defined as the pre-treatment and post-
treatment periods, respectively. Observations for the years 2001 and 2002 are excluded from the
estimation sample. Because these two years represent a window of transition from the higher
to the lower CT rates, they can neither be classified as pre- nor post-reform. In addition, the
estimation sample includes only firms created before 2001 and surviving until at least 2003.
This choice is made to prevent the downward bias in the estimated impact of the reform on firm
size that arises if the lower rate of taxation fosters the entry of new and conceivably smaller
companies into the group of eligible firms once the reduced rate is in place. In other words, the
analysis focuses on the impact of a CT reduction on incumbent companies.
After cleaning, the final unbalanced sample comprises 1,105,764 observations on 118,720
firms. Nominal values of balance sheet items are deflated by 2-digit industry-specific price
indices provided by INSEE to obtain real values of firms’ sales, total assets and tangible assets.5
By taking logs, we obtain the variables Assets and Tangibles. The variable Employees is
computed as the log of the firm’s average number of employees in each year. Finally, export
status (Exp = 1) is defined as firms’ positive revenue from foreign sales.6
4FICUS excludes only firms that opt for the micro-BIC or the micro-BNC fiscal regimes. These firms have
fewer than 10 employees and revenue below e81,500 (manufacturing) or e32,600 (services).
5As detailed in table 10 in the appendix, firms that change eligibility status for the CT reduction over the
period of analysis are dropped, as are firms that are not liable to the CT that report positive tax expenses.
The latter case may be observed because some legal statuses allow entrepreneurs to choose between income and
corporate taxation.
6Further details on these variables are provided in table 11 in the appendix.
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2.2 Identification of the treated firms
The 2001 French Fiscal Law establishes the following conditions for firm eligibility for lower CT:
(i) total revenue must not exceed e7,630,000, (ii) the firm’s legal status should make it liable
for corporate taxation (i.e., excluding firms liable for personal income taxation), and (iii) the
majority shareholder of the company must not be a business group (DGI, 2002). Unfortunately,
FICUS does not provide specific information on firms’ CT regimes. We rely instead on a set
of variables concerning legal status, affiliation to business groups and total revenue to identify
firms that are eligible for CT reduction.7
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 1997-2007, final sample.
Tangibles Exp
Nb. Firms Nb. Obs. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
All sample 118,720 1,105,764 4.485 1.849 0.187 0.390
All treated 48,999 470,488 4.523 1.478 0.266 0.442
Treated below threshold 41,560 395,599 4.298 1.404 0.229 0.420
Treated above threshold 7,422 74,742 5.688 1.286 0.460 0.498
All untreated 69,721 635,276 4.456 2.090 0.128 0.334
Business group 3,553 23,189 6.493 1.660 0.514 0.500
Large 7,029 63,854 8.995 1.514 0.828 0.377
Non-liable 60,865 548,233 3.810 1.248 0.047 0.212
We divide the full sample of ineligible firms into different subgroups on the basis of their unful-
filled eligibility condition.8 Untreated firms affiliated to a group are assigned to the ‘Business
group’ control group, those with pre-reform average revenue above e7,630,000 to the ‘Large’
control group, and those with a legal status that is not subject to corporate taxation to the
‘Non-liable’ control group. In addition, the set of treated firms is divided in two subgroups,
those with pre-reform average profits below and above the threshold of e38,120. Because the
reduced tax rate applies only to profits below e38,120, companies below this threshold benefit
7Note that the affiliation to a business group condition is more restrictive than the letter of the fiscal law,
according to which the ‘independence’ criterion is still satisfied if a single individual owns 75% of the business
group controlling the firm. Unfortunately, the data do not provide such information. Nevertheless, the number
of firms that are incorrectly identified as ineligible is not large enough to compromise the validity of the results.
See table 11 in the appendix for details on the construction of all variables.
8Firms’ compliance with the sales or profits thresholds is defined by using firm-level pre-reform averages of
total sales and profits, instead of their annual values. This is done to exclude from the computation the effect of
changes in these attributes that are due to firms’ adaptation to the new fiscal regime.
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from the full 50% cut in the average and marginal statutory rates, both of which declined from
33.33% to 15%. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for Tangibles and Exp across these differ-
ent groups. Eligible firms represent 41% of the firms in the sample. They are smaller than but
twice as export-oriented as those in the overall control group, which is dominated by non-liable
firms (87%). However, the export propensity of non-eligible firms differs substantially across
subgroups, ranging from 0.83 for the ‘Large’ firms to 0.05 for those included in the ‘Non-liable’
group.
2.3 Computing the firm-specific tax-gain indicators
The effect of taxation on investment depends on firms’ ability to discount investment and interest
expenses from taxable profits. Hence, asset composition and financial structure generate a
different impact of taxation across firms. This heterogeneity is measured by the firm-specific
marginal and average effective tax rates EMTR and EATR computed following Egger et al.
(2009).9 The marginal and average effective tax gains ∆EMTR and ∆EATR characterize the
differential impact of the reform on treated firms:
∆EMTRi = EMTR(τpre)i − EMTR(τpost)i
∆EATRi = EATR(τpre)i − EATR(τpost)i
where the pre-reform statutory tax rate τpre = 0.33 for all firms, the post-reform statutory tax
rate τpost = 0.33 if the firm is untreated, τpost = 0.15 if the firm is treated and the average
pre-reform profits A¯Pi are below the threshold of e38,120, and τpost = 0.15 ∗
(
38,120
A¯Pi
)
+ 0.33 ∗(
A¯Pi−38,120
A¯Pi
)
if the firm is treated but its pre-reform average profits are above the threshold at
which the reduced tax rate applies.10
Table 2 reports summary statistics for ∆EMTR and ∆EATR for all eligible firms and for
the two subgroups of treated firms. It becomes clear that only firms below the threshold benefit
from a reduction in their marginal effective tax rate, as well as a greater change in average
9The appendix provides further details on the computation of the effective tax rates.
10The difference between the pre- and post-reform rates is taken instead of the more conventional difference
between post- and pre-reform rates to obtain positive measures of tax gains that greatly facilitate the interpretation
of regression results.
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effective taxation. This evidence conforms to the progressivity of the average statutory tax rate
that responds to the primary aim of the policy to support the smallest firms (Raspiller, 2007).
Table 2: Tax gain from the reform within the group of treated firms.
∆EATR ∆EMTR
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
All treated 0.138 0.031 0.052 0.077
Treated below threshold 0.149 0.013 0.063 0.081
Treated above threshold 0.085 0.038 0.000 0.000
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the median ‘backward’ tax rate across treated and control
groups (left panel) and among eligible firms divided by quartiles of pre-reform average profits
(right panel) over the period considered.11
Figure 1: Evolution of the ‘backward’ tax rates
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Notes. ‘Backward’ tax rates are computed at the firm level as the ratio of tax payments over gross profits. Each line plots the median of
these rates computed at the group-year level. The left-hand side panel groups firms according to treatment status. The right-hand side panel
represents the evolution of the median ‘backward’ rates computed for treated firms belonging to different quartiles of the profit distribution.
The sharp reduction in the median tax rate between 2001 and 2003 for the group of treated firms
corroborates the strategy employed to identify the group of firms eligible for CT reduction. The
smaller decrease observed for ‘Large’ and ‘Business group’ firms is explained by the fact that
11By adopting the terminology of Egger et al. (2009), ‘backward’ rates of taxation are defined as the rates
obtained by dividing current tax payments by current gross profit. These rates are called ‘backward’ because they
are the outcome of firms’ past investment. Conversely, EMTR and EATR are defined as ‘forward’ rates because
they measure the impact of taxation on firms’ future investment.
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there was also a progressive cut in the social contribution tax that affected all firms liable for
CT after 1999. These plots also motivate the choice to exclude the years 2001 and 2002 from
Difference-in-Differences (DiD) regressions. By examining the ‘Treated’ line, it is clear that the
last pre-reform and the first post-reform years are 2000 and 2003, respectively. Furthermore,
the right panel of figure 1 shows that within the group of treated firms, the same reduction in
the statutory rate entails heterogeneous changes in average taxation.
Figure 2: Evolution of firm size and productivity
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Notes. Panels plot the evolution of the median level of the firm-level variable computed at the group-year level. Because all variables except
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The normalized series can then be interpreted as the cumulative growth since the initial period. The construction of the variables is detailed
in table 11 in the appendix.
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of firm size and productivity measured by different standard
indicators. Treated firms are those that experienced the fastest capital growth over the period
(i.e., the evolution of tangible and total assets, as well as capital intensity). This is in line
with the view that a reduction in corporate taxation increases the net present value of future
investment projects because a smaller share of the income generated by capital goods is absorbed
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by taxation. Conversely, the evolution of the number of employees does not present a distinctive
pattern across groups, suggesting that the reform may have not been as successful in promoting
employment as was the case for capital growth. If the evidence of diverging trends before the
reform suggests exercising caution in inferring causality, total factor productivity (Tfp) and
labour productivity increased somewhat faster for the group of treated firms.
The graphical analysis is also used to identify the control groups for which the Common
Trend Assumption (CTA) underpinning DiD is less tenable. This assumption requires that in
the absence of treatment, treated and untreated firms would present the same dynamics (same
trend). A control group for which the CTA is more likely to hold is that for which the pre-reform
trend in the outcome variable more closely follows the trend of the treated group. Concerning
size proxies, large firms and those that are part of a business group present a pre-reform trend
that diverges from that of eligible firms, with the former growing more rapidly than eligible firms
and the latter presenting a negative trend. However, non-liable firms appear to be appropriate
counterfactuals because their pre-reform size dynamic is very similar to that of eligible firms.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Difference-in-Differences models on firm size
The impact of a CT reduction on firm size is first identified by comparing the difference in
the levels of total assets (Assets) and capital (Tangibles) and in the number of employees
(Employees) before and after the reform for firms belonging to the treated group vis-à-vis those
belonging to different control groups. Because Assets includes both permanent and current
assets, it is the broadest measure of the three and also captures contingent variations in firms’
sales. Tangiblesmeasures firms’ capital assets and can be regarded as the outcome of investment
decisions made in previous periods. According to the fiscal literature, higher taxation reduces
investment in capital assets, and hence Tangibles is the most theoretically grounded indicator
available to trace the impact of taxation on firm size. Finally, the impact of the reform on
Employees and Tangibles is compared to verify whether a CT reduction determines Hicks-
neutral technological change by affecting capital and labour in the same way (Hicks, 1932).
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Dependent variables in levels are used instead of first differences because they better reflect
firms’ investment and employment decisions made over a longer period of time, and they are
less sensitive to inter-temporal substitution in the short term.12 This strategy is implemented via
OLS estimation of a DiD model with firm fixed-effects. The first DiD model uses the following
specification:
Yit = α+ γ1(Treati × Postt) + θi + δt + it (1)
where Y will be proxied by Assets, Tangibles or Employees, and Treat is a dummy variable that
takes value one for treated companies and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable taking value
zero or one in the pre- and post-reform periods, respectively. Firm-level fixed-effects θ control
for time-invariant, firm-specific factors that determine differences in size across individual firms,
forcing the identification of the parameter γ1 on variations in size over time within the same
firm. In addition, contingent macroeconomic shocks commonly affecting all firms are absorbed
by time fixed-effects δ, while  is the error term. The coefficient γ1 can be interpreted as the
causal effect of the reform on firm size under the CTA:
γ1 = {E[Yit|Treati = 1, Postt = 1]− E[Yit|Treati = 1, Postt = 0]} −
{E[Yit|Treati = 0, Postt = 1]− E[Yit|Treati = 0, Postt = 0]}
Although it is not possible to formally test for the CTA, graphical evidence in figure 2 provides
an indication of which control group constitutes the most appropriate counterfactual.
A different concern arises because the treated group is sufficiently large to include firms
subject to unobserved policies or shocks, the timing of which overlaps with that of the CT reform.
In this case, the first model may incorrectly attribute to the reform the effect of other factors
on firm growth. This concern is addressed by estimating a second DiD model that identifies
the impact of the reform by exploiting the heterogeneous reduction in the marginal and average
rates of effective taxation EMTR and EATR across small treated firms with pre-reform average
12In addition, figure 2 shows that for treated firms, a steeper growth of total assets and capital begins in the
period 2001-2002 that is excluded from the analysis. Therefore, a comparison of the pre-reform and post-reform
year-to-year growth rate of the dependent variables would not capture the increase in total and tangible assets
occurring within this time window.
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profits below the e38,120 threshold. Above this threshold, the average statutory rate introduced
by the reform becomes strongly progressive (i.e., it increases with the profitability of the firm),
and lower rates of average taxation would reflect lower profitability and lower growth prospects.
Instead, below this threshold, the rate of average taxation is constant and independent of average
profitability, and hence heterogeneous effective rates across firms depend only on the firms’
different capital structures and asset compositions and do not directly determine future growth.
Therefore, firm-level heterogeneity in this sample is related to the intensity of the treatment
(i.e., the reduction in effective taxation) but not to the growth potential of companies. The
second DiD model has the following specification:
Yit = α+ γ2(∆TAXi × Postt) + θi + δt + it (2)
where ∆TAX is either ∆EMTR or ∆EATR. Because ∆TAX is a continuous variable, the
impact of the reform on the asset growth of firm i is given by γ2,i = γ2×∆TAXi. If the reform
is effective in promoting growth, the coefficient γ2 is positive and statistically different from zero
because firms that enjoy greater reductions in effective rates should be more responsive to the
policy.
3.2 2SLS model on export status
Guided by the theories on corporate taxation and investment, the reduction of CT is exploited
as an exogenous shock that affects firms’ investments in capital assets (King and Fullerton, 1984;
Devereux and Griffith, 1999, 2003) to investigate whether capital growth fosters export partici-
pation. A prolific empirical literature has established that larger and more capital-intensive firms
self-select into exporting (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Blum et al., 2013; Fabling and Sander-
son, 2013). However, because both firm investment policy and export decisions are bound to
depend on unobservable strategies, this literature does not provide a clear conclusion regarding
whether a fiscal policy that promotes firm growth should be expected to foster export partic-
ipation. We address this question by estimating a 2SLS model in which the first stage is the
DiD model described above and the second-stage equation is a reduced-form linear probability
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model (LPM) of the relationship between firms’ capital and export status:
Expit = β + ζ ˆTangiblesit + θi + δt + it (3)
where Exp is a dummy variable taking value one if the firm is selling part of its output on
foreign markets and ˆTangibles is the predicted level of capital from the DiD regression.13
Because the term Treat× Post (or ∆TAX × Post) in the first-stage model on Tangibles is
the instrument excluded from the second-stage model on Exp, the exclusion restriction requires
that the reduction in corporate taxation exclusively affects export participation through its
effect on firms’ capital. It is important to note that the exclusion restriction does not imply any
specific channel through which capital affects export participation. A positive shock to the level
of capital may facilitate firm entry into exporting either by increasing firm-level productivity or
by expanding a firm’s scale of production. Although recent trade models attempt to disentangle
the relative importance of these channels to explain the positive correlation between size and
export status (Blum et al., 2013), this objective is beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Results
4.1 Does CT reduction promote firm growth?
Table 3 reports estimates from the first model (equation 1). Columns are grouped under the
names of four different estimation samples obtained by including treated firms and firms belong-
ing to different control groups. The control groups included in the samples are: all untreated
firms in Untreated, non-independent firms in Business Group, firms above the size threshold for
eligibility in Large, and firms non-liable for CT in Non-Liable. For each sample, the table reports
the estimated coefficient of Treat ∗ Post in regressions on Assets, Tangibles, and Employees.
13Although the 2nd-stage dependent variable is bivariate, a linear model appears the best alternative because
in large samples estimates from a LPM closely approximate marginal effects (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In
addition, 2SLS with a LPM in the second stage requires fewer assumptions regarding the distribution of the
endogenous variable than alternative limited dependent variable models with endogenous regressors (Dong et al.,
2012).
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Table 3: Impact on size (Treated vs. Control Groups)
Untreated Business Group
Assets Tangibles Employees Assets Tangibles Employees
Treat ∗ Post 0.108∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
R2 0.952 0.954 0.945 0.950 0.957 0.944
N 849,284 837,302 731,814 430,505 429,739 416,895
Large Non-Liable
Assets Tangibles Employees Assets Tangibles Employees
Treat ∗ Post -0.013∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
R2 0.954 0.961 0.948 0.925 0.922 0.909
N 416,648 417,748 404,604 791,665 769,360 672,786
Notes. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster unit: firm). All models control for firm
FE and year FE. Significance levels: ***.01, **.05, *.1. We exclude the years 2001 and 2002 from the
estimation because they are transition years between the “old” and “new” tax regimes.
A general pattern emerges when examining the signs of the estimated parameters across the
four samples. Moving from the pre-reform to the post-reform period, treated firms experienced
a larger positive change in total assets and capital vis-à-vis different untreated groups but a larger
reduction in employment.14 Hence, the results lend support to the fiscal literature’s prediction
of a positive effect of lower taxation on capital investment. Instead, the negative coefficient in
regressions on Employees is interpreted as evidence that the reform encouraged substitution of
capital for labour and a technological shift towards more capital-intensive modes of production.
On the basis of the graphical evidence presented in figure 2, estimates from the ‘Non-liable’
sample are preferred.15 These findings suggest that the reform caused an 11% increase in total
assets, a 4% increase in capital assets and an 8% decrease in employment as the average effect
on the group of treated firms.
14The only exception to this pattern being the positive but weakly significant coefficient on Treat ∗Post in the
regression on Assets when treated companies are compared with large companies.
15Because of the large size of the group of non-liable firms relative to the other control groups, estimates from
the ‘Non-liable’ sample are very similar to those obtained from the ‘Untreated’ sample.
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Table 4: Impact on size (within Treated)
∆EATR ∆EMTR
Assets Tangibles Employees Assets Tangibles Employees
∆EATR ∗ Post 3.114∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗ -0.728∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.326) (0.219)
∆EMTR ∗ Post 0.564∗∗∗ 0.102∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.054) (0.036)
R2 0.880 0.899 0.885 0.880 0.899 0.885
N 243,908 240,707 238,451 243,908 240,707 238,451
Notes. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster unit: firm). All models control for firm
FE and year FE. Significance levels: ***.01, **.05, *.1. We exclude the years 2001 and 2002 from the
estimation because they are transition years between the “old” and “new” tax regimes.
Table 4 reports the estimated parameters of the second model (equation 2) when using the
sample of small eligible firms. From a qualitative perspective, the results from the first DiD
model are confirmed, but these estimates suggest a quantitatively stronger impact of the reform
compared to those obtained in the first exercise. Here, the change in the statutory rate from
0.33 to 0.15 entails a mean ∆EATR of approximately 0.15 (table 2, firms below the threshold).
The estimated parameters suggest that a company experiencing such a reduction increases total
assets and capital by 47% and 11%, respectively, while it decreases employment by 11%. The
mean ∆EMTR is 0.06, and for such a change in marginal taxation, the estimated effect on total
assets, capital and employment is 3%, 0.6% and -0.8%, respectively.
The different impact of effective tax gains ∆EATR and ∆EMTR on firm size is related to
the different distortions that CT exerts on firms’ choice of ‘discrete’ and ‘marginal’ investment.
Because EATR measures the impact of taxation on the infra-marginal return on capital, its
reduction is related to firms’ decision to undertake indivisible investment projects (e.g., buying a
new piece of machinery, establishing a new production line) that are often related to a substantial
change in production technology. Conversely, a reduction in EMTR increases the return of the
‘marginal’ investment and is associated with firms expanding existing projects (Devereux and
Griffith, 1999). Therefore, most of the treatment effect on firm size is explained by the reduction
in EATR: by expecting higher infra-marginal returns on investment, small firms implement new
projects that also increase their capital intensity.
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4.2 Indirect impact on export status
Tables 5 and 6 present estimates from 2SLS regressions on export status Exp where the DiD
models on Tangibles are used in the first stage to capture capital variations explained by the
exogenous fiscal shock. Consistent with the results presented in the previous section, the in-
teraction Treat ∗ Post is a strong instrument for Tangibles, as revealed by the high values of
the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics. Table 5 reports a positive impact of capital on export
status when comparing treated firms to any of the control groups. Specifically, a 10% increase
in firm capital increases the probability of exporting to approximately 3-4%, except for the
Large sample where it increases to approximately 9%. The larger estimated parameter in this
sample may be an indication that policies promoting capital growth among domestic companies
have an heterogeneous effect on export participation across firms with different initial size (this
hypothesis is investigated more formally in the next subsection). According to the first- and
second-stage estimates from the Untreated sample, the reform caused a 1.4% increase in export
probability through the capital channel.16
Table 5: 2SLS on export status (Treated vs. Control Groups)
Untreated Business Group Large Non-Liable
Exp Tangibles Exp Tangibles Exp Tangibles Exp Tangibles
Tangibles 0.361∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.068) (0.232) (0.056)
Instrument
Treat ∗ Post 0.041∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004)
R2 0.125 0.118 0.129 0.130
N 824,754 824,754 418,415 418,415 405,723 405,723 767,999 767,999
F 284.876 103.699 52.438 331.600
Notes.Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster unit: firm). All models control for firm FE and year FE. 2SLS with
firm-level FE is implemented in Stata with the user-written command xtivreg2 (Schaffer, 2005). F is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F
statistic that is used to test for weak instruments in the first stage. Significance levels: ***.01, **.05, *.1. We exclude the years 2001
and 2002 from the estimation because they are transition years between the “old” and “new” tax regimes.
Table 6 reports the results obtained from estimating the 2SLS model on the sub-sample of treated
firms with pre-reform average profits below e38,120. Results are reported for two different
16The 1.4% average increase in export probability is obtained multiplying by 100 the product of the coefficient
of Treat ∗ Post on Tangibles (0.04) from the first-stage model and the coefficient of Tangibles on Exp (0.36)
from the second-stage model.
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specifications, in the first, Tangibles is instrumented by ∆EATR ∗ Post and in the second by
∆EMTR ∗ Post. Among the smallest firms, the effect of a capital increase on export status
is also positive but more heterogeneous than in the previous samples, as revealed by the large
associated standard error. Heterogeneity may arise due to non-linearity in the relationship
between capital and export status, for example if the marginal unit of capital exerts a positive
impact on export probability when capital is above a minimum threshold. This last hypothesis
is tested in the following section.
Table 6: 2SLS on export status (within Treated)
∆EATR ∆EMTR
Exp Tangibles Exp Tangibles
Tangibles 0.429∗ 0.633∗
(0.226) (0.357)
Instrument
∆EATR ∗ Post 0.788∗∗∗
(0.305)
∆EMTR ∗ Post 0.102∗∗
(0.051)
R2 0.106 0.106
N 240,621 240,621 240,621 240,621
F 77.900 61.025
Notes.Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster unit: firm). All
models control for firm FE and year FE. 2SLS with firm-level FE is imple-
mented in Stata with the user-written command xtivreg2 (Schaffer, 2005). F
is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic that is used to test for weak instru-
ments in the first stage. Significance levels: ***.01, **.05, *.1. We exclude
the years 2001 and 2002 from the estimation because they are transition years
between the “old” and “new” tax regimes.
4.3 Heterogeneous treatment effect
In the trade literature, productivity has been identified as the key determinant of firms’ selection
into exporting (e.g., Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 1995). However, regressions of productivity on
export status can be hardly given a causal interpretation because of endogeneity arising from
omitted variable bias and reverse causality. For this reason, productivity is omitted from the
benchmark specification. It can be argued that given the correlation between capital and pro-
ductivity, the omission of the latter from the right-hand side would bias the estimated coefficient
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on Tangibles in a standard OLS regression of export status.17 Even if the instrumental variable
strategy addresses this problem, the coefficient of Tangibles should not be interpreted as the
effect of firm size on export participation because it may also capture the productivity-enhancing
channel of capital.
An alternative specification of the 2SLS model that controls for total factor productivity
(Tfp) addresses this concern.18 It also includes Age (in logs) and Age2 to control for variations
and non-linearities in the evolution of capital over the firm life cycle and Employees to absorb
the indirect effect of the fiscal reform on employment. Table 7 reports the results from estimating
this specification on the four samples with treated and untreated firms. After controlling for
productivity, age and employment, the estimated impact of the reform on capital in the first-
stage equations increases from approximately 4% to nearly 6% when the model is estimated
on our preferred sample (i.e, Non-Liable) and on the sample including all untreated firms (i.e.,
Untreated). The second-stage coefficients on Tangibles from both the Untreated and the Non-
Liable are not statistically different from those obtained in models that exclude the additional
covariates (see table 5) and correspond to an increase in export probability of 1.4% due to the
capital channel.
Consistent with previous studies reporting that exporters are more capital-intensive than
non-exporters, the estimated coefficient of Employees is negative conditional on firms’ capital
(Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Fabling and Sanderson, 2013). As expected, Tfp is positively
correlated with export status. The productivity premium of exporters (5-6%) is slightly lower
than that reported by the ISGEP study for France (7.6%, see ISGEP, 2008). The probability
of exporting is negatively associated with firm age in a non-linear way.
The results are more sensitive to the inclusion of additional controls when 2SLS models
for Exp are estimated within the group of treated firms with pre-reform average profits below
e38,120 (table 8). One possible explanation is that among the smallest companies, the impact
of the reform on capital and export is more heterogeneous than that found in samples of larger
17The correlation between capital and productivity may arise if a positive shock in productivity leads to a higher
optimal level of capital or if productivity gains are triggered by the acquisition of more advanced equipment and
machinery.
18Total factor productivity is estimated by the Levinsohn-Petrin method (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). The
production function is estimated separately for different 2-digit industries using the log of firm total sales as the
dependent variable and the log expenditure on intermediate inputs to control for productivity shocks.
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Table 7: 2SLS on export status including controls (Treated vs. Control Groups)
Untreated Business Group Large Non-liable
Exp Tangibles Exp Tangibles Exp Tangibles Exp Tangibles
Tangibles 0.327∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 4.142 0.251∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.227) (3.161) (0.036)
Tfp 0.055∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ -0.000 0.057∗∗∗ 0.008∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.026) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005)
Employees -0.062∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ -1.483 0.371∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.004) (0.088) (0.005) (1.171) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004)
Age -0.192∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ -0.617∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ -2.836 0.694∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.008) (0.156) (0.012) (2.198) (0.012) (0.024) (0.008)
Age2 0.033∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ 0.472 -0.115∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.026) (0.002) (0.366) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Instrument
Treati ∗ Post 0.055∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.010 0.057∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
R2 0.259 0.278 0.281 0.257
N 679,423 679,423 386,340 386,340 375,036 375,036 633,040 633,040
F 252.720 3195.590 57.216 1918.179 4.406 1952.208 287.165 2996.869
Notes.Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster unit: firm). All models control for firm FE and year FE. 2SLS with
firm-level FE is implemented in Stata with the user-written command xtivreg2 (Schaffer, 2005). F is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F
statistic that is used to test for weak instruments in the first stage. Significance levels: ***.01, **.05, *.1. We exclude the years 2001
and 2002 from the estimation because they are transition years between the “old” and “new” tax regimes.
companies. The augmented specification helps to control for such heterogeneity, as is evident
from the smaller standard error of the second-stage coefficient of Tangibles (table 8 vs. table
6). Because the parameters are estimated more precisely in the augmented specification, these
coefficients are adopted to infer the average treatment effect of the reform on small firms’ capital
and export status. Among these companies, the change in the statutory rate from 0.33 to 0.15
is associated with an average change in EATR of 0.15 ( table 2). In turn, this average reduction
of EATR causes an average increase in capital assets of 29% and a 6% greater probability of
exporting. The mean 0.06 reduction in EMTR is instead associated with only a 2% increase in
capital and a 0.5% increase in export participation. Estimates from this specification confirm
that the reduction in infra-marginal taxation is the primary cause of the increase in capital and
export participation for small firms.
Building on previous results, the final exercise investigates the extent to which heterogeneity
in the treatment effect of the reform can be explained by initial size and productivity. To
do so, we compare the firms’ pre-reform average value of Tangibles and Tfp to the 2-digit
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Table 8: 2SLS on export status including controls (within Treated)
∆EATR ∆EMTR
Exp Tangibles Exp Tangibles
Tangibles 0.206∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.077)
Tfp 0.074∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
Employees -0.022 0.356∗∗∗ -0.038 0.356∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.006) (0.028) (0.006)
Age -0.098∗ 0.712∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.017) (0.055) (0.017)
Age2 0.017∗ -0.118∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
Instrument
∆EATR ∗ Post 1.931∗∗∗
(0.268)
∆EMTR ∗ Post 0.304∗∗∗
(0.045)
R2 0.249 0.249
N 229,478 229,478 229,478 229,478
F 120.056 1030.500 114.620 1030.267
Notes.Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster unit:
firm). All models control for firm FE and year FE. 2SLS with firm-
level FE is implemented in Stata with the user-written command
xtivreg2 (Schaffer, 2005). F is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F
statistic that is used to test for weak instruments in the first stage.
Significance levels: ***.01, **.05, *.1. We exclude the years 2001
and 2002 from the estimation because they are transition years
between the “old” and “new” tax regimes.
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industry median. Firms are divided into four groups: small and low-productivity (Group 1),
large and low-productivity (Group 2), large and high-productivity (Group 3) and small and high-
productivity (Group 4) firms. 2SLS models are separately estimated for each of these groups,
comparing the treated companies to all untreated firms. The results are reported in table 9.
Table 9: 2SLS on export status by initial productivity/size (Treated vs. Un-
treated)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
(Small-Low prod) (Large-Low prod) (Large-High prod) (Small-High prod)
Exp Tangibles Exp Tangibles Exp Tangibles Exp Tangibles
Tangibles -4.165 0.749 0.124∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(4.866) (0.595) (0.070) (0.014)
Instrument
Treat ∗ Post -0.007 0.010 0.051∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
R2 0.176 0.045 0.079 0.221
N 213,137 213,137 166,195 166,195 227,298 227,298 217,509 217,509
F 9.331 6.043 37.235 167.163
Notes.Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster unit: firm). All models control for firm FE and year FE. 2SLS with
firm-level FE is implemented in Stata with the user-written command xtivreg2 (Schaffer, 2005). F is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald
rk F statistic that is used to test for weak instruments in the first stage. Significance levels: ***.01, **.05, *.1. We exclude the
years 2001 and 2002 from the estimation because they are transition years between the “old” and “new” tax regimes. Group
1: small and low-productivity; Group 2: large and low-productivity; Group 3: large and high-productivity; and Group 4: small
and high-productivity.
A significant and positive effect on Tangibles and Exp is found only for Groups 3 and 4. Because
these two groups include the more productive 50% of firms in the sample, it can be concluded
that a CT reduction has a significant impact on capital accumulation and export status only
on relatively more productive firms. It is conceivable that when taxation is reduced, high-
productivity firms expand their set of profitable investment opportunities significantly more
than do low-productivity firms. In addition, the treatment effect of the reform on Tangibles is
much stronger for productive and small firms (Group 4) than it is for productive and large firms
(Group 3). Hence, a CT reduction appears to be particularly effective in removing obstacles to
the growth of small and productive companies.
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5 Conclusion
This study generates novel and robust evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal policy to promote
SMEs’ capital growth and, through this channel, export participation. Specifically, we analysed
the effects of a reduction in corporate taxation for small and medium enterprises. A positive
impact on capital and export status is found when comparing the evolution of these variables
between treated and untreated companies after the introduction of the policy and when inves-
tigating the heterogeneous gains from the policy within the group of treated firms.
The results suggest that the impact of this policy is heterogeneous across firms. When
evaluated on the entire group of eligible companies, the average treatment effect of the reform
on capital assets and export probability is +6% and +1.4%, respectively. In turn, it increases
to +29% and +6%, respectively, when these effects are estimated on the subgroup of treated
firms with average pre-reform profits below e38,120. The findings also indicate that the impact
of the reform is conditional on firms’ initial productivity. It can be concluded that a reduction
in the rate of corporate taxation is an effective policy to promote the capital growth and the
exports of more productive small companies.
Some caveats are in order. First, the empirical strategy adopted in this study does not
identify the precise mechanism through which capital growth fosters greater export entry: the
results are consistent with both a productivity-enhancing channel à la Melitz (2003) and with
a size channel as in Blum et al. (2013). Second, while the reform was effective in promoting
capital growth, it also appears to generate a substitution of capital for labour. Our tentative
interpretation of this result is that lower taxation on profits may induce the adoption of more
capital-intensive production techniques. This preliminary evidence of labour substitution calls
for further research to understand the technological implications of CT reductions.
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Appendix
A1. Computation of the effective tax rates
This section describes the methodology to compute the firm-specific marginal and average effec-
tive rates of taxation, EMTR and EATR. The EMTR measures the distortion that taxation
induces on investment as the difference between the return of capital at the margin with taxation
(p˜) and without taxation (the opportunity cost of capital, r¯):
EMTRi =
p˜i − r¯
p˜i
(4)
According to the formulation of Devereux and Griffith (2003), p˜i is computed as:
p˜i =
1−Ai
(1− τ)(1− in) [i+ δi(1 + in)− in]−
F (1 + i)
(1 + τ)(1 + in) − δi (5)
where r¯ is the average real return of capital (set at 0.05 following Egger et al., 2009), in is
the inflation rate and i is the nominal interest rate (and firms’ opportunity cost). We compute
i = [(1 + r)(1 + in) − 1] using the long-term interest rates for r, and the year-to-year change
of the consumer price index for in, where r and in are both obtained from OECD data. The
parameter τ is the statutory CT rate. Eventually, Ai and δi are two firm-specific variables that
measure respectively the net present value of the depreciation allowances per unit of investment,
and the economic depreciation of firms’ assets. Following the approach of Egger et al. (2009),
we obtain Ai and δi as:
Ai = Am ∗ θmi +Ab ∗ θbi +AI ∗ θIi
δi = δm ∗ θmi + δb ∗ θbi + δi ∗ θIi
where θmi, θbi and θIi are the shares of machineries, buildings and intangibles over the total assets
of firm i. FICUS data provide information on the composition of firms’ assets into tangible and
intangible. To disaggregate further tangible assets into buildings and machineries, we rely on
industry shares obtained from McKenzie et al. (1998). Am, Ab and AI are the net present values
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of depreciation allowances calculated with asset-specific linear depreciation rates as reported in
the French law.19 δm = 0.1225, δb = 0.0361 and δi = 0.15 are the standard parameters used
in the tax literature for the economic depreciation of machineries, buildings and intangibles.
Firms’ financial structure (i.e., the proportion of debt financing) enters into the computation of
the EMTR through the term F in equation 5:
F =

0, if investment is self-financed;
(1−τδ)[i−i(1−τ)]
1+i , if investment is financed through debt;
Eventually, the effective marginal tax rate EMTRi of firm i is calculated as:
EMTRi = EMTRsi ∗ (1− levi) + EMTRdi ∗ (levi)
where EMTRsi is the rate obtained by assuming complete self-financing, EMTRdi is the one
obtained by assuming complete debt-financing, and levi is the proportion of debt financing of
firm i computed as the debt share over total assets. Because we are interested in evaluating the
impact of the reform on firms that are ex-ante different in terms of assets and financial structure,
we use firm-level pre-reform averages of levi and Ai, instead of their yearly values. This is done
to isolate the change in effective taxation caused by a change in statutory rates from the changes
happening through different channels (i.e., asset composition or financial structure).
Following Devereux and Griffith (2003), the EATR instead represents the gap between the net
present value (NPV) of an investment project in the presence of taxation (Ri) or without (R∗):
EATRi =
R∗ −Ri
p/(1 + r) (6)
where Ri and R∗ = p−r1+r are respectively the NPV of the investment with and without tax, and
p = 0.2 is the standard parametrization of the pre-tax real return of capital (Egger et al., 2009).
R is computed as follows:
R = (1− i)−1{(1 + in)(i+ δ)(1− τ)− (1−Ai)[(1 + i)− (1 + in)(1− δi)]}+ F (7)
19Bulletin Officiel des Finances Publiques, bofip.impots.gouv.fr/bofip/4520-PGP?datePubl=17/04/2013.
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As for the EMTR, the firm-specific return to investment Ri is calculated as a weighted average
of R in case of self-financing and in case of debt-financing. The firm-specific value EATRi is
eventually obtained as in equation 6.
A2. Data information
Table 10: Data cleaning.
Nb. of observations
Original data 1,901,891
Drop if the firm changes treatment category -261,475
Drop if non-liable firm has a positive tax expense -36,179
Data after cleaning 1,604,237
Drop if the firm is not present before -498,473
and after the reform
Final sample 1,105,764
Table 11: Computation of the main variables
Name Description
Tangibles Deflated book value of tangible assets, in logs
Exp Binary variable, firms with positive foreign sales
Assets Deflated book value of total assets, in logs
Employees Number of employees, in logs
Capital Intensity Ratio of deflated tangible assets over the total number of hours worked, in logs
Age Age +1, in logs
Labour prod Ratio of deflated value added over the total number of hours worked, in logs
Tfp Method: Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
(Backward) Tax rate Ratio of corporate tax expenses over total gross profit.
elo Identifier for ‘Business group’ control group
elc Identifier for ‘Large’ control group (total sales > e7,630,000)
elj Identifier for ‘Non-liable’ control group (based on legal status)
Treat Eligibility dummy: = 1 if elj= 1, elo= 1 and elc= 1, 0 otherwise
Post Reform dummy: = 1 if t > 2002, 0 otherwise
Note. Variables are deflated at the 2-digit level using information provided by INSEE.
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